July 15, 2022 an Amtrak train struck a piece of track maintenance equipment in Oakland, CA https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/RIR2311.pdf NTSB lays the blame on the equipment operator. My bigger question goes to what kind of training UP has provided there MofW Personal. When a track authority is issued to MofW, it applies to the track(s) authorized ONLY. It DOES NOT provide any form of protection on any other track(s). Why the person in charge of the MofW equipment THOUGHT he could foul any other tracks at a road crossing for ANY REASON is the employee's failure to understand the rules he is operating under - A SERIOUS FAILURE. A serious failure of the UP rules education methods for MofW employees.
I was thinking back to a crash in Edison, NJ on 04/20/1979 when an Amtrak train hit a Plasser track maintenance machine. Per the report below, the Dispatcher and tower operators messed up. At the time, a friend told me that a tower operator failed to place something on the handle on the interlocking machine, a visual and tactile reminder that the track that was being worked was out of service and the handle was not to be touched. I think I've seen photos of these in use. https://trid.trb.org/view/150331
When track(s) are taken out of service for any reason. The person controlling access to the track(s) in all the rule books I am familiar with is required 'Block Off' the signal controlling access to the track(s). The physical appearance of the blocking device(s) are different depending upon what kind of device is necessary to line the signal. When possible, switches granting access to the out of service track are to be lined in a position away from the track that is out of service. Where field personnel control the signals, the operator of that control point is to notify the Train Dispatcher that the Blocking Device(s) who will make notation on his Trainsheet BEFORE granting authority for the track(s) to be taken out of service. In the CADS (Computer Aided Dispatching System) of the 21st Century, the Train Dispatcher will manipulate the software of CADS to apply the necessary protection before the Train Dispatcher can issue the authority taking the track(s) out of service. In the original incident in this thread, the MofW employee only had authority on the track his equipment had operated on rail. He had no authority to foul any other tracks besides the track he occupied. If he was attempting to remove his equipment from its authorized track at the road crossing, he STILL did not have authority to foul ANY OTHER track but the one he occupied. The NTSB report does not indicate that the employee had any communication with the Train Dispatcher about his intent to foul additional track(s) to remove his equipment from his authorized track.
