That NYC Accident!

I can't believe it ! An exact reenactment of the one in Spain 4-5 months ago !!! Too fast on a curve ! What is with these idiot engineers or the management of and the fatigue problem ! This kind of work should insist that the minute an engineer is feeling sleepy he should be allowed, with no penalty, to request a replacement. Better train is late waiting for new guy than to have death pay a visit ... Give each engineer 3 times a year to call for this back-up. If it persists, fire him !!

 

What I find puzzling is the speed that he allegedly entered the curve at. 82 mph is a really high speed for a commuter train.
Does their equipment not have overspeed limiters? On BNSF/METRA, they are set at 72mph. You hit that speed and that alerter will wake the dead. Failure to reduce speed will cause the limiter to perform a penalty application of the braking system. I just cant believe there were that many human and mechanical failures. Or is the commuter authority too cheap to install overspeed limiters? There are too many half-spoken statements being made. IE the news is reporting that the timetable speed goes from 75mph to 70mph and then suddenly to a 30mph for a curve? What was the distance allowed for the speed reduction to be made? Were there speed limit signs or flags or signal indications in place for such a drastic reduction in speed. Did the hogger have written track warrants or any form Bs or any other indicators to warn him of an approaching speed restriction. Why would the railroad allow a track geometry that allows a 70 mph on tangent to be restricted to a 30mph curve? Was this curve speed a temporary speed restriction? If not why wasn't the curve ever eased or had it's radii changed? From the photos I've seen, this trackage was not constricted by buildings or geology. We have a lot to learn about this tragedy. IMO culpability for this disaster doesn't lie solely on the operating crew.

Charlie

 

I agree with your concerns on the reported speed. What the early NTSB reports are saying, is that No, this cab car did not have an alerter on it. That was mentioned in the olter thread we have going here. (Could/should we merge these two?)

 

This does look a lot like the Spainish derailment right down to the media pulling reasons out of their hats to see if they can blame the engineer.

 

Interesting remarks Charlie. Those on the board with hands on railroad experience must be viewing this accident through a completely different lens than those of us that are simply rail enthusiasts much less the general public. I hope you continue to provide your insights as the investigation continues.

Sent from my SCH-I535 using Tapatalk

 

Charlie, that line has been in place for about 150 years, developed by the New York & Hudson River RR (IIRC), which became New Central's Hudson Division. The line's location is restricted by geography, i.e. Hudson River, Harlem River, and >100 foot high granite cliffs. That line was NYC's four track mainline to all points west, including Chicago. That line goes into Grand Central Terminal in central Manhattan, originally built by the New York & Harlem RR. The Hudson line was built after the Harlem line, and Commodore Vanderbilt chose to use the GCT location rather than build a separate terminal, also he had just acquired the Harlem line. The New York Central also had a freight line continuing straight south on Manhattan from Spuyten Duyvil along the Hudson to its West Side yards, now used by Amtrak and NYP (Penn Station).

This may be TMI, but I hope it explains why this very heavily used line cannot be moved or modified.

 

Thanks Hytec, I really enjoy reading your informed comments about the NYC, I envy you the opportunity you had to witness it first hand. My biggest question though is why there is this seeming sudden drop of greater than half the previous track speed. Whether or not the cab car had an alerter(Why would you bring a sub-par piece of equipment to play a major role?) the train should still have had an overspeed device that would have been activated by that high speed. I am having a bit of a problem with the statement that the hogger "zoned out". Rolling stock exhibits different characteristics at various speeds. ie, rock,roll,vibration,sounds etc. A good hogger can regulate his speed by the feel of the equipment and the appearance of landmarks as the train passes them... its the "count the line poles and see how many you count in a minute" process. Believe me when I tell you that an engineer CAN feel the in-train dynamics by the seat of his pants. That's why you may hear an engineer say "I sucked some vinyl on that trip"! In the cab you can actually feel run-in and run out of your train! As others have said, the NTSB is not releasing a lot of "intelligence" on this matter. I am VERY interested in learning what happened.

Charlie

 

Charlie, I fully agree with seat-of-the-pants operation, be it a P32AC-DM locomotive, MTA cab car, Triumph TR3 sport car, International KB5 truck, Farmall MD tractor, or Piper J-3 Cub, all of which can cause pucker strings to hum at times. It all boils down to being "one with your environment" at all times. BTW, your reference to "line poles" probably doesn't apply to the MTA Hudson and Harlem lines any more. I assume they were pulled many years ago.

 

Technology aside ! I drive my auto (diesel !) very astutely but relaxed . I use good judgment at all times, keep back one car length for every 10 MPH, don't drink (perhaps one [legal] beer on very hot days in L.A. But Never soused !). If I were an engineer responsible for hundreds of lives and millions of dollars of equipment I'd behave no differently, especially since I obtained such a sweet job to begin with ! And, no beer on work days ! Running a train, though much more involved than a car still seems to be a no brainer speed/weight/conditions/weather conditions/curves/signals or potentially changed signals up ahead, et al. There is no excuse for his speeding up like that, of all places ! The motors don't just start reving faster by themselves ! AND he said " I zoned ". That's an admittance of guilt looking for sympathy ( "Heh, heh" [spoken like Beavis and Butthead],"If I fess up at the start they'll, heh , heh think I'm a good guy . Heh Heh ..."). Senseless manslaughter ! 15 years !! OR, if was mistake of signal Dept. not showing a restriction today, then 15 years for him/her them ....! Murder my loved ones will you ? !!

 

A friend sent me this first-hand analysis of the safety factors developed and in use by the railroads serving New York City.


Spuyten Duyvil: Why? A safety expert weighs in

Written by William C. Vantuono, Editor-in-Chief

Pearl Harbor. Dallas. 9-11. Lac Mégantic. Now we have “Spuyten Duyvil” to add to the collection of names that, before they became linked to tragedy and loss of life, were simply locations, or dates. You’ve probably read many of the press reports (including whatRailway Age has covered) and seen the videos on Metro-North’s horrific Dec. 1 wreck. The accident, which now appears to be caused by human error, has turned into a media circus involving politicians and rail union reps, the latter now censured by the National Transportation Safety Board for compromising “confidentiality of investigative information” and being removed from participation in the investigation.

While I don’t claim to be a railroad safety expert and I’m not a signal engineer, I know enough about cab signals and speed codes and alerters and automatic train stop to try to understand what happened—and to ask, why? This morning I was updating our on-line report with the latest information on the crash when I received a message from a railroader who, through personal experience, is more than qualified to address many of the questions swirling around Spuyten Duyvil.
And so, with his permission, I share with you the observations of a veteran railroader, PATH Principal Safety Engineer Paul J. Messina:

“Since the tragic derailment of a Grand Central-bound Metro-North train Sunday morning on the Hudson Division at Spuyten Duyvil curve, I’ve asked myself, why? Why in 2013 would a train’s safety and operation be totally in the hands of an engineman without an overriding backup system to ensure the application of a emergency brake when the train is moving faster than permitted operating speed?

“I have a great deal of respect for the operations personnel and management of Metro-North and the Metropolitan Transportation Authority, and am not criticizing them. For that railroad, and the MTA as a whole, safely carries millions of riders a day. This accident is not only a Metro-North problem, it’s an industry problem, for each day thousands of freight and passenger trains are operated with the safety of the train, passengers, crew, freight, etc., entirely reliant upon on the operational expertise of the engineer. Experience, mental and physical health, fatigue, and other factors play critical roles in the safety of each train.


“I feel personally affected by the accident, because every workday morning I ride Metro-North, in the car just ahead of the locomotive, rounding Spuyten Duyvil curve at approximately 6:10 a.m. Usually half asleep, I don’t worry about my safety. This is so because I am particularly aware of Metro-North’s track enhancement program, and know that the sharp curve at that location has been rebuilt with CWR and concrete ties. The cars always glide smoothly through that curve as we leave the Hudson and meet the banks of the Harlem River. Lateral movement through that curve is hardly noticeable. The New York Central built this ‘Water Level’ right-of-way in the 19th century, and thousands upon thousands of trains have plied these rails for more than 100 years without incident.

“I represent PATH as an instructor with the Transportation Safety Institute, and teach a Rail Incident Investigations course. While reviewing the photos from the wreck, I concentrated on the overturned cars. Speed, I believed, was the primary causal factor.

 Overturned passenger cars throughout practically an entire seven-car consist certainly struck me and reminded me of the course that we teach at TSI, and causal factors for derailments and collisions.


“Prior to spending 26 years at New York City Transit, I worked for the Penn Central and Amtrak. I was a locomotive technician assigned to ride high-speed electric-multiple-unit (EMU) Metroliners (see photo) and various classes of electric passenger and freight locomotives. I rode between New York (sometimes New Haven) and Washington, D.C. every workday. My job was to troubleshoot various systems aboard any equipment that took power from the catenary. Every train was protected by a cab signal system that was developed and placed into service by the Pennsylvania Railroad in the 1930s.


“With the development of new high-speed electric locomotives in the early 1930s capable of hauling passenger trains at 100 mph, signal engineers with foresight developed and designed a cab signal system to protect PRR trains. The cab signal system included wayside position light signals that provided several aspects—Clear-Track Speed (which could be above 100 mph, depending on location); Approach Medium-Restricted to 45 mph; Approach-Restricted to 30 mph; and Restricting-Stop, then proceed to the next wayside signal at 15 mph with permission from the tower. The engineman had these aspects duplicated in the operating cab.

“The system was simple: A low current was transmitted through the running rails. Pickup devices on the front of the locomotives would read the current and transmit it to the onboard cab signal system, which would display an aspect in the cab. When an engineman received a restricting signal, he had to immediately apply the train line brakes. Also, an alerter sound had to be acknowledged within approximately 20 seconds. Otherwise, the system would take over and apply the emergency brakes. Safety at its best—developed in the 1930s—and still employed (with upgrades, of course) by Amtrak and the commuter railroads (NJ Transit, SEPTA, etc.) that operate on the Northeast Corridor. The Metro-North Hudson Division right-of-way, inherited from the New York Central, does not utilize this type of cab signal system.

“Each of us has a memory that we will never forget, an incident that is etched in our minds. Having worked on the Northeast Corridor for eight years, I have quite a number of memories. One is etched in my mind: It was the summer of 1979. I was working as a technician aboard a six-car Amtrak Metroliner EMU out of Washington D.C. The Metroliners were equipped with the PRR cab signal system and a cab alerter. My engineman was the best. He had more than 30 years of experience with the Pennsylvania and Penn Central railroads. I felt totally confident in his abilities and would entrust him with my life.

“My train, No. 118, left Washington, D.C. on time and proceeded at about 105 mph north to Baltimore. I walked through the train to check traction motor 
amperage readings on each of the six cars. When I completed my work, I proceeded to the head end and spoke with the engineman. After we left Baltimore, I went back through the six-car consist to check air conditioning, lighting, and ride quality, as the Metroliners were equipped with an air bag secondary suspension. Cruising between 105 and 110 mph between Baltimore and Wilmington, Del., I wanted to make sure that the ride was comfortable, with no equipment abnormalities.


“I was crossing the vestibule of the fourth car into the snack bar car when the train went into emergency. I immediately turned around and headed forward toward the cab. Passengers had questioning looks on their faces, and the head brakeman looked concerned as I raced forward to the lead car and the cab. I could smell the odor of burning brake shoes as I passed through each vestibule. The train came to a halt before I reached the head end. I entered the cab at the same time as the conductor.

“We found the engineman slumped in his seat, unconscious. (We later found out that he had a stroke, which he survived). I distinctly remember the sound of the overspeed bell ringing continuously in the cab, the sound of the air expulsion from the emergency brake application, and the cab signal displaying an Approach aspect indicating a 30 mph restriction. Having passed out, the engineman could not acknowledge the restricting aspect and apply the brakes to slow the train. His master controller was in the ‘cruise’ position to maintain a 105-mph speed. Consequently, the cab signal system took control and automatically brought our speeding Metroliner to a halt.

“My conductor looked ahead out of the cab window and whispered, ‘Oh my gosh!’ I looked through the window, and saw the caboose of a Conrail freight train several thousand feet north of our position, on our track. In those days, we still operated freights with electric locomotives on the NEC. The freight was crossing over from our track onto another, so that No. 118 could continue on at 105 mph. I thought, and still think now, what would have happened if the cab signal system had not been there? We were traveling at about 105 mph; the freight, 30 mph at best, through a crossover. Within seconds, we would have collided. So, a cab signal system placed into operation in the 1930s effectively stopped and saved a speeding Metroliner from disaster.

“Today, we are looking to introduce Positive Train Control (PTC) nationwide to protect train movements. Here at PATH, we’re installing a Communications-Based Train Control (CBTC) system that will enable us to move our trains safely, while providing us with the opportunity to 
maximize our rights-of-way.

"To clarify, the existing Metro-North cab signal system enforces train separation only. It does not enforce permanent civil speed restrictions (i.e. a 70-mph section of tangent track followed by a 30-mph curve). As consultant Dave Schanoes, a former Metro-North executive. explains: “All Metro-North trains are equipped with a cab signal/automatic train stop/automatic speed control system with an alerter that requires acknowledgement. All territory on Metro-North east of the Hudson River, save the Danbury and Waterbury branches, is cab signal/automatic train control territory and has been for almost 20 years—which coincides with an FRA mandated change after the Amtrak/Conrail collision at Chase, Maryland. The reason why the cab signal alerter did not sound, and why an overspeed brake penalty did not occur, is because the train was traveling a ‘normal route’ with no trains ahead, requiring a brake application to maintain safe train separation. The Metro-North cab signal system does not include permanent speed restrictions due to curvature, alignment, run-off, or other elements of the track geometry. The cab signal/train stop/speed control system is driven by conditions of occupancy requiring deceleration of a following train, or a divergence in route at an interlocking, where a signal change is precipitated by a change in routing.

'We must also bear in mind that no train control system, no matter how sophisticated, is 100% fail-safe 100% of the time, although it can come very close to that. Anyone who thinks that “nothing bad can ever happen because of the technology that’s been installed” is flirting with disaster. The engineers who designed the Titanic said the ship was unsinkable. Apollo 13 experienced a quadruple systems failure 200,000 miles out because a small liquid oxygen tank thermostat failed. Need I say more?

A new overlay PTC system, supplied by a Bombardier/Siemens joint venture, will be installed throughout the MTA’s two commuter railroads, Metro-North and the Long Island Rail Road. PTC—already in place on much of the NEC (Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement System)—will provide an extra measure of safety, a measure that we now know, because of a tragedy, is critically needed. The contract was announced roughly two weeks before experienced engineman William Rockefeller, apparently during a brief lapse of attention, ran his train off the rails and into the history books of accident reports and statistics. - - - -

 

Mr. Vantuono's post answers some questions but still leaves obvious questions. Was the train equipped with overspeed equipment and why did it fail to give a penalty application? Another of the questions is why a transition from 70 mph to 30mph? Mr.Vantuono's post seems to indicate that "this is the way things have always been done" and " no train control system, no matter how sophisticated, is 100% fail-safe 100% of the time". As he so capably points out, this was a corporate philosophy of NYC carried over into MTA. In my way of thinking-and I guess it is largely influenced by my BNSF background-that pragmatic attitude is not sufficient to alleviate any culpability. Being on a system that has large areas of CTC,one is ingrained with speed control. It governs every turn of the wheels. You see the light, you know the color,you know what it means,you know what speed you had better be by the next signal and you know what possesions you have to shed after losing your job for failing to heed what you d--ned well should have known and heeded. When I travel the Interstate system in Chicago driving to my daughters place on the North Side, the road parallels the UP(former C&NW) line(s)for a good distance, I inadverdantly find myself calling out,in my mind, the signal indications on the adjacent tracks. I am NOT perfect by any long shot and I cannot say for certain that I would never allow myself to have a lapse of abilities as Mr. Rockefeller alleges. I am in agreement with Eagle 2 in stating that there is much NOT being said. What IS being said has probably been misunderstood and overblown by the media. They only report the happenings, they dont run trains.
My biggest fear is that in the "shakeout" of this investigation there will be facts determined that will further advance the carriers drive to eliminate the human factor and go to remote control operations. More people will be thrown out of work POSSIBLY due to the flouting of safety and operating rules and just plain carelessness by just a tiny fraction of the work force. Some politician running for re-election will get on a soapbox and frighten the electorate into thinking that the railroads are operating their trains with slothful,irresponsible,negligent personnel and that a stupid computer chip is the way to go. Sadly their isn't a computer or communications system made,and for that matter,ever will be made,that CANNOT be hacked into. The electorate will never hear that. Who do you blame when a driverless train traveling uncontrollably derails in a heavily populated area,killing and injuring scores of people? Think about it! Anyway this has gone on too long.
I ain't gonna solve it, I don't even wanna try!

Charlie

 

Reminds me of my first experience with slack action in helper service. hboy:

 

I don't trust technology to do the job of keeping me safe. I would much rather place my life in the hands of a professional. I've seen way too many examples of tech glitches, poor design, incorrect maintenance, and delays or a crippled machine due to failed components. I'm certain that passenger delays caused by failed equipment would be newsworthy as well.

Each and every day the casualties in this country caused by inattentive drivers on the highways is more than twice the rate of train accidents. Why isn't this fact more alarming to the press than this relatively minor wreck in Brooklyn? I'll bet more than 4 people died in traffic accidents the same day in the NY area. How many people lose their lives in grade crossing accidents alone? Yes, put in perspective this is a minor accident !!!

In time I feel the railroads will be regulated to a standstill if the media keeps up their biased and usually fabricated reporting. The problem isn't technology , the problem is the media and instant worldwide sensationalism of events, any slackjaw yokel with a smart phone can get worldwide attention if he happens to be in right spot at the right time and cause mass hysteria and government regulators to panic and apply un-needed rules and mandates just to pacify the ignorant.

What was the overspeed device set at ? I am assuming that it is set at around 85 mph? So I don't think we should assume that the device was defective. I think there are way too many people making assumptions and sadly many of them have the attention of the press. I have seen the press find railroad "experts" and quote them on railroad gospel only to find out that the "expert" wasn't really as qualified as we are lead to believe. All this speculation (in the press) serves to do is muddy the waters and distract the investigators from the real facts. Wonder why the investigations take so long ?

On a forum such as this I believe that most folks are eager to learn as much about trains as they can ,I do not think that speculation on a forum like this is harmful. Usually if someone makes an incorrect assertion there is always someone to correct them, this is how we learn. There is always a cool head and someone with experience to point out the flaws in a discussion. As long as we do it nicely and are polite we can serve as teachers to enlighten others and point them to the real facts. Keep the discussion going !!!

I don't know what caused this accident, I don't pretend to be an expert.

Randy

 

I fully realize he was NOT intoxicated. That is my point ! He can not even claim that (as he being a victim of a disease of society, alcoholism ). All the techno-justified entries in this thread will never convince me otherwise as to what did happen.. He admitted it at the get-go.. " I zoned out ". Hello ! He fessed up right then and there. " I told 'em up front so I (he) must be a good-fellow-after-all ", ploy . Now the RR is trying to conger a technical fault so as to not be held liable for hiring the dope in the first place ! Again, he admitted it ! " I zoned" !
Uh, well officer, I must have zoned when I ran that stop sign back at Elm and 1st. Uh, so sorry I hit those kids.....Uh, um, I, uh ....